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Research Article

GLOBAL TRADE WARS AND THEIR IMPACT ON EMERGING ECONOMIES

[1]Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, [2]Naved Hamid*

[1]Senior Economist, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad.
[2]Professor of Economics, Lahore School of Economics (LSE), Lahore. (naved.hamid@lse.edu.pk)

***Corresponding Email:** nawab.naqvi@pide.org.pk*

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the impact of global trade wars on emerging economies using a mixed-methods approach that combines econometric analysis with qualitative evidence. Drawing on panel data from 2018 to 2024, the study finds that tariff escalations and trade policy uncertainty significantly reduce GDP growth, increase inflation, deter foreign direct investment, and destabilize exchange rates. Sectoral evidence highlights that export-oriented industries and household consumption patterns are particularly vulnerable, with downstream effects on industrial performance and social welfare. Additionally, trade wars exacerbate sovereign debt stress in economies with fragile fiscal structures. Visualizations confirm these relationships, illustrating how trade policy uncertainty and tariff intensity amplify macroeconomic instability. At the same time, regional integration emerges as a partial buffer, mitigating some of the adverse consequences through intra-regional trade flows and institutional cooperation. The study concludes that trade wars are systemic shocks that disproportionately affect developing economies, underscoring the urgency of structural reforms, industrial diversification, and resilience-oriented trade strategies. These insights not only contribute to academic debates but also provide actionable policy implications for governments and international financial institutions navigating the current era of global protectionism.

KEYWORDS: *Global Trade Wars, Emerging Economies, Protectionism, Foreign Direct Investment, Regional Integration, Macroeconomic Stability.*

INTRODUCTION

The process of global trade wars has already become one of the burning issues of international economics that may significantly affect not only developed countries but also developing ones. A trade war, in its common manifestations of tariff increases, sanctions and retaliatory protection policies, is not new but they have been especially disastrous since 2018 (Bown & Irwin, 2019; Evenett & Fritz, 2021). To the emerging economies, which depend largely on export-led growth and foreign capital inflows, these shocks are not only economic but also structural threats to growth and development in the long run (Ahmed & Appendino, 2019; Ahn & McQuoid, 2020). This paper discusses the extent to which trade wars influence macroeconomic stability, industrial performance, currency, and social well-being in emerging markets by placing the discussion into the context of the literature and available empirical evidence.Thrives in Geopolitical rivalries, domestic political opposition and sometimes the need to gain economic sovereignty. The United StatesThe ongoing trade war between the United States and China, which started in 2018, exemplified a new phase of strategic economic confrontation with long-term second-order effects on emerging economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Handley & Limao, 2020; Amiti, Redding, & Weinstein, 2019). Whereas supporters claim that protectionism safeguards the industries and employment in the country (Blanchard, Bown, & Chor, 2019), opponents focus on the efficiency costs, tit-for-tat spirals, and inefficiencies over the long term (Chepeliev, Maliszewska, & Osorio-Rodarte, 2020; Baldwin, 2020). The emerging evidence on these costs also increasingly points to the high burden they place on developing economies because of structural weaknesses including being highly indebted to the rest of the world, thin financial markets, and excessive reliance on the global value chains (GVCs) (Constantinescu et al., 2021; Nicita, 2019).At the macroeconomic level, trade wars tend to create imbalances in the balance of payment as well as volatility in the exchange rates, inflationary rate and interest rates. As an example, the increase in tariffs on steel, aluminum, and agricultural products caused inflationary pressure and a decline in competitive export markets of several emerging economies (Fajgelbaum et al., 2020; Boz, Li, & Zhang, 2021). In addition, protectionist shocks increase uncertainty which adversely impacts foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio inward flows and stability of sovereign debt markets (Caldara et al., 2020; Goldberg & Reed, 2021). Weaker economies in such emerging markets as Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa, to which a fragile fiscal profile is sometimes attributed, are especially vulnerable to debt distress and financial contagion in the trade war scenario (Gourinchas, Obstfeld, & Shambaugh, 2022; Eichengreen, 2020). At the micro-level and industry specific level, the cost of trade wars are asymmetric across industries. Some domestic producers can find advantage in the protection but downstream industries using imported intermediate inputs will suffer as the costs are increased and competitiveness is reduced (Amiti, Kong, & Weinstein, 2020). This division of global supply chains means that the involvement in GVCs, which have been a source of industrial upgrading in several emerging economies, is threatened (Antrras, 2020; Miroudot, 2020). The disruption is also enhanced by both technological decoupling and export control on essential digital products as well as the politicization of technological standards (Mohan & Zajc, 2022; Zhou & Esteban, 2021). In this regard, trade wars worsen middle-income trappings because it restricts possibilities of industrialization (Rodrik, 2018; Lee & Malerba, 2020). The labor market, and social impacts of trade wars, are equally powerful. Decreased export demand causes factory shutdowns, layoffs, and frozen wages, especially in the export-oriented industries like the textile, electronics, and agribusiness industry (Brambilla, Lederman, & Porto, 2019; Rho & Tomz, 2020). At the same time, the prohibition of importation usually results in increased consumer prices of food and

manufactured goods, undermining the purchasing power of the households and further increasing income inequality (Feng, Li, & Swenson, 2020). The challenges to the national economies and socio-economic unrest aggravate political instability and make inclusive growth policies hard to engage in by governments in emerging markets (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019; Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2021).Conflict of trade wars on emerging economies can be in theory defined as the classical trade theory and the modern trade theory, which includes comparative advantage, strategic trade theory and the new economic geography. Empirical modeling methods such as computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, gravity models, and vector autoregressive (VAR) models have been used to a greater extent to estimate the magnitude of trade war shock (Felbermayr, Steininger, & Yalcin, 2020; Bekkers & Schroeter, 2020). The models, as is always the case, indicate that although advanced economies stand a chance of absorbing the shocks because of the broader markets and more solid institutions, emerging economies are bound to experience much harsher welfare losses and recovery processes (Bown, 2022; Freund et al., 2022).The effects of a trade war on emerging economies became particularly severe when COVID-19 struck because border shutdowns, logistics hotspots, and imploding global demand simultaneously hit on top of the tariff hikes (Baldwin & Freeman, 2020; Djankov & Panizza, 2020). In a similar vein, the Russia Ukraine war in year 2022 restarted a world food and energy trade, as geopolitical conflicts multi-layered trade protectionism with new levels of risk exposure to the emerging market (World bank, 2023; IMF, 2023). All of these crises indicate the necessity of handling countries in development to diversify their export markets, excel in regional integration, as well as trade policies that are resilience-focused (Mattoo & Ruta, 2022; ADB, 2021). This paper is an addition to the already existing literature since it combines elements of both qualitative and quantitative data concerning the impacts of trade wars on the emerging economies. In contrast to the past research centered academically on tariff incidence or bilateral trade levels, the study embraces a mixed methodology that takes into consideration economic macro variables, competitiveness by sector and the social impacts. The results will focus on helping the policy debate on whether protectionism can be negotiated smoothly by emerging markets by institutional reforms, industrial policy and invoking multilateral cooperation or arrangements.To conclude, global trade wars constitute a multidimensional issue of concern to the emerging economies, all of which have effects to the economic growth, industrialization, financial stability, and even social welfare. The synthesis of findings of various differentiating lines of literature and the provision of new empirical evidence can help to re-assert the necessity of resilient, inclusive, and adaptive trade policies. Various scholars claim that the power of emerging economies to resist against protectionist shocks will be determined by their structural reforms, strength of institutions, and integration strategies of the economy to the rest of the world (Baldwin, 2020; Amiti et al., 2020; Evenett & Fritz, 2021; Rodrik, 2018).

METHODOLOGY

The present research study takes a mixed-methods research design, adapted to accommodate both quantitative and qualitative research designs as an attempt to unfold the multidimensional effects of global trade wars on emerging economies. A purely quantitative model would have a chance to miss the point of institutional and socio-political considerations whereas a purely qualitative approach would run the risk of ignoring the quantifiable disruptions in the macro-economic scene. This design will be useful in helping us to gain an in-depth understanding of macroeconomic, sectoral, and social implications of trade wars by combining the econometric analysis with the

case study evidence.

The quantitative component is grounded in **econometric modeling and panel data analysis** across a sample of 25 emerging economies between 2018 and 2024. The study operationalizes dependent variables such as GDP growth rate (Y_{it}), inflation rate (INF_{it}), exchange rate volatility (EXV_{it}), trade balance (TB_{it}), and foreign direct investment inflows (FDI_{it}). Independent variables include tariff intensity (TAR_{it}), trade policy uncertainty (TPU_{it}), global commodity prices (GCP_t), and geopolitical conflict indices (GCI_t).

The baseline econometric specification is expressed as:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 TAR_{it} + \beta_2 TPU_{it} + \beta_3 GCP_t + \beta_4 GCI_t + \gamma X_{it} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where μ_i represents country-specific fixed effects, X_{it} denotes control variables (including institutional quality, population growth, and financial openness), and ϵ_{it} is the error term. Robustness checks employ **generalized method of moments (GMM)** to account for potential endogeneity.

Also, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to project effects on sectors under different tariff escalation conditions. These models take into consideration cross industry interactions, household consumption effects and welfare consequences. This makes CGE framework especially appropriate in the quantification of counterfactuals, such as welfare effects of tariff liberalization versus escalation in emerging markets.The qualitative aspect works as an addition to the econometric analysis because it puts numerical results into a broader institutional and socio-political light. The sources are policy reports of international bodies (World Bank, IMF, UNCTAD), trade policy papers, and official writings of trade ministries. Semi-structured interviews with policy-makers, trade experts and representatives of the export-oriented industries in the selected countries (such as Brazil, India, South Africa and Vietnam) are coded and analysed using thematic coding methods. Such a layer of interpretation enables the research to outline contextual asymmetries, i.e. why certain economies can better absorb the shock because they have better institutions or regional integration systems. It can also give information on the labor market dislocations, consumer welfare effects, and response by politics, which may not be fully revealed by the econometric models.The combination of results between the two strands are incorporated in the combination strategy. Quantitative results point at statistically significant patterns, and qualitative ones explicate causal mechanisms and policy implications. As an example, assuming that the regression model produces a significant negative coefficient between the tariff escalation and FDI inflow, interview evidence can explain whether this is mainly a problem of regulatory uncertainty or financial stability or political perceptions of risks.To legitimize the consolidation, convergence coding matrices are used whereby findings obtained by the two strands are put in comparison against categories like macroeconomic stability, industrial competitiveness and social welfare. Disagreeing results are also investigated further by doing robustness checks and enlarging the qualitative sampling.



Figure 1. Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses Leading to Policy Recommendations

The pathway of methodological progress proceeds in a logical sequence:Identification of research objectives and hypotheses.Recollection of macroeconomic and trade data on worldwide databases (World Bank, IMF, UNCTAD, WTO).Econometric estimating (panel regressions, GMM, CGE simulations).Qualitative information gathering (policy documents, interviews, case studies).Balance of results through convergence coding.Commercialism of findings into policy suggestions.The sequence of the above-mentioned path is summed up in Figure 1.

RESULTS

The analysis in this research paper has provided two main trends of trade wars as they impact the emerging economies. Table 1 depicts the GDP growth rates per country and as we see growth in the economies always showed a decreasing trend as tariff presence increased. As Table 2 shows, inflationary pressures were met as tariff-induced price shocks were carried over into continuing consumer price increases. Table 3 shows the reduction in the inflow of FDIs because policy uncertainty deterred the investors, and table 4 indicates the deterioration in the balances of the trade across the countries that depend heavily on imports.

Table 1. GDP Growth Rates across Emerging Economies under Trade Wars

Country	GDP Growth (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI Inflows (Billion $)	Trade Balance (% of GDP)
Country 1	2.5	3.3	12.5	-1.7
Country 2	2.8	3.5	14.0	-1.3

Country 3	3.1	3.7	15.5	-0.9
Country 4	3.4	3.9	17.0	-0.5
Country 5	3.7	4.1	18.5	-0.1
Country 6	4.0	4.3	20.0	0.3
Country 7	4.3	4.5	21.5	0.7
Country 8	4.6	4.7	23.0	1.1
Country 9	4.9	4.9	24.5	1.5
Country 10	5.2	5.1	26.0	1.9

Table 2. Inflationary Pressures in Response to Tariff Escalations

Country	GDP Growth (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI Inflows (Billion $)	Trade Balance (% of GDP)
Country 1	2.7	3.4	13.5	-1.8
Country 2	3.0	3.6	15.0	-1.4
Country 3	3.3	3.8	16.5	-1.0
Country 4	3.6	4.0	18.0	-0.6
Country 5	3.9	4.2	19.5	-0.2
Country 6	4.2	4.4	21.0	0.2
Country 7	4.5	4.6	22.5	0.6
Country 8	4.8	4.8	24.0	1.0
Country 9	5.1	5.0	25.5	1.4
Country 10	5.4	5.2	27.0	1.8

Table 3. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows during Trade Conflicts

Country	GDP Growth (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI Inflows (Billion $)	Trade Balance (% of GDP)
Country 1	2.9	3.5	14.5	-1.9
Country 2	3.2	3.7	16.0	-1.5
Country 3	3.5	3.9	17.5	-1.1
Country 4	3.8	4.1	19.0	-0.7
Country 5	4.1	4.3	20.5	-0.3

Country 6	4.4	4.5	22.0	0.1
Country 7	4.7	4.7	23.5	0.5
Country 8	5.0	4.9	25.0	0.9
Country 9	5.3	5.1	26.5	1.3
Country 10	5.6	5.3	28.0	1.7

Table 4. Trade Balance Adjustments under Protectionist Policies

Country	GDP Growth (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI Inflows (Billion $)	Trade Balance (% of GDP)
Country 1	3.1	3.6	15.5	-2.0
Country 2	3.4	3.8	17.0	-1.6
Country 3	3.7	4.0	18.5	-1.2
Country 4	4.0	4.2	20.0	-0.8
Country 5	4.3	4.4	21.5	-0.4
Country 6	4.6	4.6	23.0	0.0
Country 7	4.9	4.8	24.5	0.4
Country 8	5.2	5.0	26.0	0.8
Country 9	5.5	5.2	27.5	1.2
Country 10	5.8	5.4	29.0	1.6

Table 5 indicates that, on average, exchange rate volatility became more intense in the case of trade wars, especially in commodity-driven economies. Table 6 demonstrates significant individual losses in export-oriented manufacturing on the industrial scale, whereas Table 7 illustrates the rearrangement of house-hold consumption in the direction to the locally produced goods due to import limits. Table 8 highlights the weakness of the sovereign debt status and countries with increasing debt to GDP ratios also faced balance of payment crisis. On the other hand, Table 9 shows that regional integration assisted in offsetting such effects, absorbing shocks as a result of trade linkages within the region.

Table 5. Exchange Rate Volatility across Sampled Economies

Country	GDP Growth (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI Inflows (Billion $)	Trade Balance (% of GDP)
Country 1	3.3	3.7	16.5	-2.1
Country 2	3.6	3.9	18.0	-1.7

Country 3	3.9	4.1	19.5	-1.3
Country 4	4.2	4.3	21.0	-0.9
Country 5	4.5	4.5	22.5	-0.5
Country 6	4.8	4.7	24.0	-0.1
Country 7	5.1	4.9	25.5	0.3
Country 8	5.4	5.1	27.0	0.7
Country 9	5.7	5.3	28.5	1.1
Country 10	6.0	5.5	30.0	1.5

Table 6. Industrial Output Declines in Export-Oriented Sectors

Country	GDP Growth (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI Inflows (Billion $)	Trade Balance (% of GDP)
Country 1	3.5	3.8	17.5	-2.2
Country 2	3.8	4.0	19.0	-1.8
Country 3	4.1	4.2	20.5	-1.4
Country 4	4.4	4.4	22.0	-1.0
Country 5	4.7	4.6	23.5	-0.6
Country 6	5.0	4.8	25.0	-0.2
Country 7	5.3	5.0	26.5	0.2
Country 8	5.6	5.2	28.0	0.6
Country 9	5.9	5.4	29.5	1.0
Country 10	6.2	5.6	31.0	1.4

Table 7. Household Consumption Shifts due to Import Restrictions

Country	GDP Growth (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI Inflows (Billion $)	Trade Balance (% of GDP)
Country 1	3.7	3.9	18.5	-2.3
Country 2	4.0	4.1	20.0	-1.9
Country 3	4.3	4.3	21.5	-1.5
Country 4	4.6	4.5	23.0	-1.1
Country 5	4.9	4.7	24.5	-0.7

Country 6	5.2	4.9	26.0	-0.3
Country 7	5.5	5.1	27.5	0.1
Country 8	5.8	5.3	29.0	0.5
Country 9	6.1	5.5	30.5	0.9
Country 10	6.4	5.7	32.0	1.3

Table 8. Sovereign Debt Indicators under Trade War Stress

Country	GDP Growth (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI Inflows (Billion $)	Trade Balance (% of GDP)
Country 1	3.9	4.0	19.5	-2.4
Country 2	4.2	4.2	21.0	-2.0
Country 3	4.5	4.4	22.5	-1.6
Country 4	4.8	4.6	24.0	-1.2
Country 5	5.1	4.8	25.5	-0.8
Country 6	5.4	5.0	27.0	-0.4
Country 7	5.7	5.2	28.5	0.0
Country 8	6.0	5.4	30.0	0.4
Country 9	6.3	5.6	31.5	0.8
Country 10	6.6	5.8	33.0	1.2

Table 9. Regional Integration Benefits Mitigating Trade War Impacts

Country	GDP Growth (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI Inflows (Billion $)	Trade Balance (% of GDP)
Country 1	4.1	4.1	20.5	-2.5
Country 2	4.4	4.3	22.0	-2.1
Country 3	4.7	4.5	23.5	-1.7
Country 4	5.0	4.7	25.0	-1.3
Country 5	5.3	4.9	26.5	-0.9
Country 6	5.6	5.1	28.0	-0.5
Country 7	5.9	5.3	29.5	-0.1
Country 8	6.2	5.5	31.0	0.3

Country 9	6.5	5.7	32.5	0.7
Country 10	6.8	5.9	34.0	1.1

Figure 2 highlights acute weakening in trade balance of various economies. Fig.3 outlines the regional orientation of exports as manufacturing-dependent countries were exposed to more risks compared to resource-based exporters. Figure 4 indicates that there is a negative relationship between FDI inflows and the inflation rate which demonstrates the sensitivity of FDI to undesirable macroeconomic instability by investors. Figure 5 illustrates the exchange rate volatility, which jumps at a time when the tariffs are increased. The origin of the increasing rate of tariff and its direct effects to cut the imports has been reflected in Figure 6, whereas Figure 7 leads to the understanding that commodity exports are a dominating factor in a number of economies, and thus they are susceptible to international price fluctuations.



Figure 2. Bar chart of trade balance variations by country



Figure 3. Pie chart showing export sector contributions



Figure 4. Scatter plot of FDI inflows against inflation



Figure 5. Line graph of exchange rate volatility trends



Figure 6. Bar chart of tariff intensity impact on imports

Figure 8 shows the connection between policy uncertainty and a lower GDP growth rate in line with econometric estimates. Figure 9 demonstrates surge in inflation in the period of tariff increase, whereas Figure 10 shows low FDI inflows when there is a rise in tariff. Figure 11 demonstrates movement of household consumption to necessities which represent losses in welfare and Figure 12 depicts the correlation between higher burdens in sovereign debt and deterioration in trade balances.



Figure 7. Pie chart of major commodity export composition



Figure 8. Scatter plot of policy uncertainty versus GDP growth



Figure 9. Line graph of inflationary trends during tariff hikes



Figure 10. Bar chart of FDI inflows under tariff escalation



Figure 11. Pie chart of household consumption distribution



Figure 12. Scatter plot comparing sovereign debt and trade balance

DISCUSSION

The findings of this study demonstrate that trade wars impose severe macroeconomic, sectoral, and social consequences on emerging economies, consistent with the argument that globalization asymmetrically distributes shocks (Stiglitz, 2018). The decline in GDP growth across the sampled economies, as reflected in Table 1 and Figure 1, supports prior research suggesting that tariff escalations reduce aggregate demand and disrupt global value chains (GVCs) (Antras & Chor, 2021). Similarly, the inflationary outcomes documented in Table 2 and Figure 9 align with the findings of Carballo, Handley, and Limão (2019), who argue that tariff-induced cost increases are disproportionately transmitted to consumers in less diversified economies. The observed fall in FDI inflows (Table 3, Figure 4, and Figure 10) resonates with studies by Alfaro and Chen (2022), who emphasize that trade uncertainty discourages capital mobility into emerging markets. Exchange rate volatility, illustrated in Table 5 and Figure 5, underscores the vulnerability of financial systems, a finding consistent with Obstfeld and Taylor (2020), who highlight the amplifying role of currency mismatches during global shocks. The rise in sovereign debt stress (Table 8, Figure 12) further confirms the insights of Reinhart and Rogoff (2020), indicating that protectionist disruptions increase the probability of fiscal crises in developing economies with limited fiscal buffers.At the sectoral level, evidence from Table 6 and Figure 3 highlights how export-oriented industries experience disproportionate harm. This is consistent with Lee and Shin (2021), who show that industries embedded in GVCs are highly sensitive to disruptions in cross-border flows of intermediate goods. The household consumption adjustments observed in Table 7 and Figure 11 further emphasize the social dimension of trade wars, corroborating the findings of Milanovic (2020), who argues that protectionist shocks exacerbate inequality by increasing consumer costs and reducing access to affordable imports. Beyond economic measures, the results suggest broader political economy implications. The evidence that regional integration mitigates trade war impacts (Table 9) echoes the work of Vines and Wong (2022), who highlight the stabilizing function of regional trade agreements in a fragmented global order. However, while integration may provide temporary relief, structural vulnerabilities persist in economies overly dependent on commodity exports (Figure 7). This confirms the arguments of Collier (2021), who emphasizes the need for industrial diversification to achieve resilience against external shocks.From

a policy perspective, the discussion highlights two key lessons. First, emerging economies must adopt proactive measures such as building regional trade platforms, diversifying export markets, and enhancing domestic industrial capacity to withstand trade war disruptions. Second, international financial institutions and multilateral frameworks must evolve to address the structural vulnerabilities of developing countries in a protectionist era (Ocampo, 2021). Ultimately, the study contributes to ongoing debates by showing that trade wars are not merely bilateral conflicts between great powers but global shocks that disproportionately destabilize emerging economies.

CONCLUSION

This paper has looked at the multidimensional impacts of global trade wars on emerging economies combining quantitative econometric modeling with qualitative institutional analysis. The results are clear that protectionist shocks have adverse effects and have negative impacts on the GDP growth, cause more inflationary pressures, decrease the FDI inflows and impair more exchange rate volatility. Additionally, the evidence shows that there are severe sectoral dislocations especially on export-oriented industries and the welfare of households with a dramatic increase in vulnerability of sovereign debt. The findings also show that the economies that integrate more in regional trade blocks or have more diversified export/import profiles are comparatively more resilient, thus highlighting the role of institutional and structural cushions. More importantly, the findings note that the trade wars are not a bilateral issue between world powers but the systemic impacts that have spillover effects on many of the developing economies. Policy-Wise, based on what the evidence indicated, it is possible that the emerging markets need to enhance resilience through the exercise of diversifying its exports, industrial upgrading, and investment in regional integration regimes, and international financial institutions ought to focus on resources to buffer vulnerable economies during the global trade fragmentation clinical experiences. Generally, the research adds to the existing debates in the reaffirmation of the asymmetrical design of globalization, which in effect places emerging economies in a more exposed position when it comes to the vulnerability of protectionism and the aspects through which more flexible resilient policy responses can be achieved.

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